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 In nulear emergency condition, after determining the initiating event and 
the type of the anomaly, operators should take counteractions to control 
the reactor to mitigate the accident and to bring back the plant to the safe 
condition. The actions should based on emergency operating procedures. 
In order to minimize the human error related to the actions, some 
necessary information is needed. Such kind of information is the 
consequence of the actions, which can be derived by modeling the 
counteractions. Multilevel flow modeling (MFM), a functional 
modeling, is chosen to model the counteraction with the consideration 
that it is based on cause-effect relations and consequence reasoning, it 
provides realization relationship which corresponds physical 
components with their functions, and it provides comprehensive 
diagnosis based on human perspective of the system objectives. The 
counteractions are represented by the control functions in the MFM. 
This paper discusses how to model the counteractions and the 
consequences of the actions to the system components, which are 
necessary to enhance situation awareness and to reduce human errors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION∗ 
Research and development of reactor safety 
and technology is one of the main focus of five year 
plan 2015-2019 of BATAN, especially for 
preparing the construction of the first nuclear power 
plant (NPP) in Indonesia. Some analysis and 
evaluations related to the technical aspects of the 
plant including core reactor, reactor safety systems, 
instrumentation and controls, and so on, have been 
undertaken. Besides the technical factors, human 
factor is one of important aspects of safety in 
nuclear power plants and should be considered fom 
designing process to operation phase of the 
plants.The benefits of considering human factor are 
the performance of the safety functions can be 
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optimized as well as the improvement of the 
effectiveness of reactor operation [1, 2]. 
Human factors are correlated with the 
operators of nuclear power plants, which their main 
tasks are to monitor and to control the reactors. In 
normal operation, they should monitor the plant 
status through a large screen display and have to 
make sure that component paremeters are in normal 
level. However, when anomalies occur, indicated 
by the deviation of the parameter levels, they 
should determine the initiating event, cause of the 
anomalies, and then conduct some appropriate 
actions to control the reactor and bring back the 
plant to the safe condition. In a well known 
abnormal condition, the operator actions are related 
to the input signal validation, plant and system 
status identification, and also refer to the 
emergency operating procedures (EOPs). 
In addition, the counteractions should be 
conducted appropriately to reduce human error. 
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There are two types of human errors related to the 
counteractions: commission errors and omission 
errors. Commission errors are type of errors caused 
by operators misconduct, while omission errors 
happens when operators omit some steps of the 
counteractions. 
The counteractions of operators in one case 
can recover the state of a controlled component and 
in other case will affect other components and the 
system. The consequences of the counteractions 
should be anticipated by operators to minimize the 
human errors and to keep the plant in safe 
condition. 
Therefore, the information about the impact of 
the counteractions is needed by operators. It can be 
achieved by modeling the counteractions using 
multilevel flow modeling (MFM). The 
counteractions can be modeled by using control 
functions in MFM. The counteractions include the 
objective of the action, condition of actions and 
component to be controlled. It is relevant to the 
concept of control function in MFM. 
The information of the impact of the 
counteractions can be gathered by implementing 
cause-effect relation and influence propagation in 
MFM. Controlling a component by changing its 
state will affect other components in the system. 
The state of the affected components should be 
monitored and considered. Therefore, the kind of 
information is necessary for operators to do the 
control task to mitigate the accident without any 
mistakes.In addition, it will increase the situation 
awareness of the operators. Situation awareness is 
the ability of operators to receive and understand 
the information of the plant status, and to predict 
the future state of the plant based on the 
information [3]. 
This paper discusses the modeling of operator 
actions in mitigating an emergency condition using 
MFM control functions. In the MFM model of 
PWR plant, a Steam Generator Tube Rupture 
(SGTR) accident scenario is applied as a case 
study. A simplified EOP of SGTR accident is used 
by operators to mitigate the accident. One of the 
procedure step, which is “Reactor Coolant System 
(RCS) cooldown using steam dump through steam 
dump valve”, is discussed. The purposes and 
benefits of the modeling (the purpose and impact of 
the control actions) are investigated by 
implementing the cause-effect relations and 
influence propagation rules in MFM.  
2. OPERATOR’S TASKS 
During the operation of nuclear power plants, 
anomalies may happen indicated by the change of 
parameter level of some important components 
related to safety. In addition, it is also indicated that 
the states of components are changed, for example, 
from normal to abnormal value, from high to low 
value or vice versa. 
The anomalies, in the worst case condition, 
can cause the plat operated in abnormal and 
emergency condition. In addition, it will impact the 
intergrity of the reactor core and public because of 
the realeasing of radioactive material to the 
environment.  
Therefore, control actions are needed to 
change the state of components and to bring the 
plant back to the normal and safe operation. The 
purpose of control systems is to make sure that 
material and energy balance are managed, which in 
turn to keep the safe operation of the plant [4]. In 
addition, operators should have appropriate 
information about the purpose and function of the 
control system, especially in case of diagnosis and 
counteractions of the anomalies in the plant [4]. 
This information is necessary to determine the 
cause of the disturbance of the plant and the 
impacts of the counteractions. However, the 
information of the purpose of the control system 
usually is not provided from P&I diagram but from 
knowledge of the expert about the design problem 
[4]. 
Related to the mitigation of emergency 
conditions, operators should refer to the EOPs. 
Since the anomalies have been identified as well as 
the initiating event  and the type of the accident, 
they should select the appropriate EOPs and follow 
the procedure steps completely. Moreover, they 
should make sure that there are no mistakes and 
errors while conducting the counteractions. The 
next section discusses the overview of the EOP. 
3. EMERGENCY OPERATING 
PROCEDURES 
Operation procedures provide information and 
guidance for operators to operate and monitor the 
plant during normal operation; and help them to 
make decision and to take counteractions during an 
emergency condition in order to mitigate the 
accident, and to bring the plant into safe operation 
condition as in Fig. 1. The information and 
guidance are combined to minimize human error.  
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Fig. 1. Modeling the counteractions 
 
 During the life time of the plant, some 
anomalies may happen in the plant. Based on the 
anomalies, the plant conditions can be divided into 
three conditions: abnormal conditions, 
accident/emergency conditions, and severe accident 
conditions depending on the severity of the 
anomaly. In abnormal conditions, the anomalies do 
not cause any significant damages to safety related 
components and can be handled by normal control 
systems. The anomalies are indicated by the alarm 
messages and changing the parameter level of 
components from the normal setpoints. In this case, 
operators should implement an appropriate alarm 
response procedure to identify the anomalies. In 
some cases, the abnormal operation may change to 
a more complex operation condition if the 
malfunctions happened in core cooling system or in 
a support system. Operators should do the counter 
actions to compensate the malfunctions or faults 
following the abnormal operating procedures 
(AOPs). Examples of abnormal conditions are 
malfunction of a component of normal running 
plant and a fault in the function of a component of 
control system. 
 Examples of accident conditions are steam 
generator tube rupture (SGTR), loss of coolant 
accident (LOCA) and loss of offsite power 
(LOOP). In case of emergency, the used procedure 
is emergency operating procedure (EOP). Operators 
should follow the EOP to control the plant and 
cannot only rely on their knowledge and 
experiences.  
When the accident conditions reach the severe 
condition, severe accident guidelines (SAGs) is 
used to mitigate the accident. Severe accident 
conditions are accidents which include significant 
core degradation. SAGs are used when the EOPs 
cannot effectively preventing the core damage. 
Compared with EOPs which focus on preventing 
core damage, SAGs concentrate on maintaining 
other barriers for protecting the release of 
radioactive materials to public. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
The paper discusses the modeling of operator 
actions by apllied the control function in MFM as 
can be seen in Fig. 1 The overview of MFM 
including the MFM control function which is useful 
for modeling the operator actions will be discussed.  
An example is given to describe the modeling of 
the operator actions and their impacts to other 
components and the system. 
 
4.1. Overview of MFM 
Multilevel flow modeling (MFM) was 
developed by Morten Lind [5] to model the 
complex industrial plants in term of functions and 
objectives and their interconnected relations, In 
other words, it represents systems in means 
(functions) to achieve ends (objectives) relations. 
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Fig. 2. MFM symbols 
 
MFM has been widely used for alarm and root 
cause analysis [5], counteraction and dynamic 
operation permission [6, 7], supervisory control [8], 
and faults diagnosis [9] in nuclear, chemical and 
electrical power engineering.The functions and 
objectives in MFM are represented by symbols as 
can be seen in Fig. 2, which consist of functions 
(such as source, transport and storage) and relations 
(influence, means-end and control). The functions 
correlate with the physical components of  plant, 
for example, a transport function is correlated with 
a pipe and a tank is represented by a storage 
function. An MFM model generally consists of 
mass flow systems, energy flow systems, control 
systems and objectives. Each of function primitive 
is connected by influence relations.  
 
4.2. Overview of MFM control functions 
Operator’s action or a counteraction conducted 
by human is a manual intervention to the system. 
The purpose of the counteractions is to change the 
state or produce a new state of a component or a 
system by controlling or changing the state of other 
component based on the operational or control 
condition values. In case of nuclear power plant, 
the objective is to change the plant state in a safer 
one and/or to mitigate the influence of an anomaly. 
A simple example of counteraction is 
controlling water level of a tank as seen in Fig. 3. 
The idea is that a tank is filled by water through a 
pump and a valve. When the water reach the 
minimum level, the valve is opened and the water 
flows from the pump to the tank. The valve will be 
closed if the water reaches the maximum level in 
the tank which will stop the flow water to the tank. 
Based on the example, the purpose of the control 
action is to fill the tank with water in a predefined 
value, the operational condition is the water level,  
the controller is human or automatic system to open 
or close the valve; and the component to be 
controlled is the valve.  
 
Fig. 3. Simple water tank diagram 
 
MFM as a functional modeling of complex 
industrial plants also accommodates the control 
functions, represented by the control functions in 
the MFM symbols (Fig. 2). The concept of control 
function in MFM was proposed by Lind [10] and 
has been implemented in some studies [11,12]. 
Lind in [10] describes that there are several types of 
control functions in MFM (steering, regulation, 
tripping and interlock) as can be seen in Table 1. 
From the table, the steering function ensures that p 
is produced or in other words, it is used to produce 
a new state of a component or a system. It is 
relevant with the counteraction which is to produce 
of a new state of a function. Therefore, the counter 
action is modeled using MFM control function, 
based on the idea proposed in [10], as can be seen 
in Fig. 4. Control structure (cfs1) represents the 
counteraction/operator action from which to 
produce a new state of a storage function sto1 (a 
function to accumulate mass or energy) in mass 
flow system mfs1 (represents a system to deliver 
mass or material) as the conditional operation or 
system objective. Then the conditional operation 
will actuate the production control function pco1 
(which is used to produce a new state), which 
represents the operator, to change the state of the 
transport function tra1 (a function to transfer mass 
or energy) to accommodate the new state of sto1. In 
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case of water tank (Fig. 3), the operator who 
controls the valve is represented by pco1, a 
component to be controlled (tra1) is the valve, and 
the objective obj1 (represents a state which should 
be produced) of the system is to fill in the tank 
(sto1) with water. 
 
Table 1. Type of control functions[10] 
Task Symbol Purpose 
Steering 
 
Ensure that p is 
produced 
Regulation 
 
Ensure that p is 
maintained 
Tripping 
 
Ensure that ~p is 
produced 
Interlock 
 
Ensure that ~p is 
maintained 
 
 
Fig.4. MFM control functions[13] 
 
4.3. MFM Model of PWR Plant 
 In this study, a simplified diagram of 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) plant is used, as 
can be seen in Fig. 5 [13]. A PWR system has 
primary system and secondary system. Primary 
system transfers heat generated in the fuel and 
stored in reactor vessel to the steam generator. The 
steam generator produces steam and then the steam 
is introduced to turbine to rotate the electric 
generator. The mechanical energy to rotate is in 
turn converted to electricity (electrical energy). The 
steam that some heat energy is lost will be 
delivered to the condenser and condensed into 
water and then transferred to the steam generator. 
 A PWR also has safety systems which will be 
functioned in case of emergency. When an anomaly 
happens in the plant,for example loss of coolant 
accident (LOCA), the reactor will be automatically 
shutted down by the reactor trip and then the safety 
injection signal is actuated to operate the 
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) to provide 
water to the reactor coolant system. Although the 
reactor is shutdown, it still produces decay heat. 
The decay heat should be removed to cooldown the 
reactor by bypassing the turbine and dumping the 
steam to the condenser. The cooldown process then 
is completed by the residual heat removal system. 
The simplified PWR diagram is converted to 
the MFM model as seen in Fig.6. This model is a 
modification of the MFM model developed by [14]. 
The MFM model includes major PWR systems 
(primary system by mass flow structure mfs1 and 
secondary system by mfs2) and safety systems such 
as emergency core cooling system (efs9), residual 
heat removal system (sto1) and internal spray 
system (sto2). The further explanation of the MFM 
model of the PWR plant is provided in [13]. 
The main objective (obj1) of the MFM model 
of the PWR system is to generate the electricity. It 
can be accomplished by converting the heat energy 
into electrical energy. Initially the heat is generated 
in fuel (sou3 in efs1) installed in reactor vessel 
(sto3 in mfs1) and by fission reaction (represented 
by the energy flow structure efs1).  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Simplfied diagram of PWR plant[14] 
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 The heat is transferred from primary system to 
secondary structure (efs7) through the steam 
generator bal14 (primary side) and sin3 (secondary 
side). Furthermore, the heat is converted into 
mechanical energy in efs6 to rotate the turbine and 
generator (efs8). Finally, the electrical energy is 
produced (obj1). 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. Case study  
As a case study for modeling the operator 
actions, a SGTR scenario is applied to the 
simplified diagram of PWR plant. Operators should 
do the counteractions to mitigate the accident refer 
to the EOP of SGTR accident, in this study, the 
simplified of EOP of SGTR accident of Mihama 
unit 2 [13]. However, only one procedure step will 
be discussed in this paper to describe the modeling 
of operator action. 
SGTR is one of common and potential 
accident in PWR plants and there are some operator 
actions depending on the plant conditions.The 
SGTR accident is indicated by the decreasing of 
pressurizer level and pressure, increasing the level 
of steam generator, and increasing radiation in main 
steam line. The ruptured steam generator (SG) 
should be identified and isolated to prevent the 
release of radioactive material to the environment. 
In addition, the decay heat should be removed to 
cooldown the reactor.  
The mitigation of the SGTR accident should 
refer to the EOP of SGTR accident and should be 
conducted step by step by the operators. For 
analysis purposes, this paper only discuss one 
procedure step of the EOP, which is: “RCS 
cooldown using steam dump through steam dump 
valve”. Figure 7 shows the part of MFM model of 
RCS cooldown using steam dump valve 
operation.This step is executed after the level of 
faulted/intact SG has been regulated to the setpoint 
value and the safety injection (SI) has been stopped.   
 After the reactor trip and safety injection 
operation, the reactor is in hot shutdown condition. It 
means that the residual heat remains in the system 
and should be removed by dumping the steam from 
the SG in order to cooldown the RCS. In case of the 
condenser is available, the steam can be dumped by 
bypassing the turbine and opening the steam dump 
valve to let the steam directly flow to the condenser.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6. MFM model of PWR plant [13] 
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Fig. 7. Part of MFM model of RCS cooldown using steam dump valve operation 
 
Table 2. Parameters of modeling of RCS cooldown 
operation 
RCS cooldown using steam dump valve 
Items Physical 
components 
MFM model 
Operation 
condition 
Low temperature of 
RCS 
Low volume of 
sto10 in efs15 
Objective To decrease the 
temperature of RCS 
obj15 
Control 
function 
Open the steam 
dump valve 
pco7: disable the 
bar11 
Controlled 
component 
Steam dump valve bar11 
Control 
objective 
To open the steam 
dump valve 
cobj7 
 
 In Fig. 7, the temperature level of the RCS is 
represented by the state of sto10 in efs15 (energy 
flow of RCS). Therefore, the operation condition is 
the low volume of sto10 which is correlated with the 
obj15, which in turn the control function pco7 
(represent the operator action) is actuated to disable 
the barrier function bar11 (steam dump valve) in 
mfs2 (secondary function). If the barrier function is 
disabled, it means that the mass or energy can be 
transferred through the function. Therefore, it can be 
considered that the barrier function acts as a transport 
function (the valve is open). 
 The parameters of modeling the RCS 
cooldown using steam dump valve are provided in 
Table 2. As mentioned in the previous sections that 
the purpose of modeling the operator action is to 
derive the objective of the control action and to 
derive the impact of the counteractions. Therefore, 
to qualitatively analyze the impact of the counter 
actions, the influence propagation rules is 
implemented. In order to analyze the influence 
propagation, some definition of states of MFM are 
needed. The definition of states is based on [15] 
and modified by the author in [13] as can be seen in 
Table 3. 
  
Table 3. Definition states of MFM [13] 
Symbols States 
source normal, high output flow potential, low 
output flow potential, no output flow 
potential 
sink normal, high input flow, low input 
flow, no input flow 
transport normal, high flow, low flow, no flow 
storage normal, high volume, low volume, no 
volume 
barrier normal, leak 
balance Normal (balance), unbalance (fill or 
leak) 
threat exist (high), exist (low), non-exist 
Objective true (high), true (low), false 
 
 Since the barrier function bar12 is disabled, it 
means that steam dump valve is open and it will let 
the large amount of steam directly flowing to the 
condenser (sto7: high). The states of components 
after the counter action are given in Fig. 8. 
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Fig. 8. Impact of RCS cooldown using steam dump valve 
 
 Based on the definition states of MFM, the 
impact of the counteractions can be analyzed using 
influence propagation rules. Influence propagation 
means that the change of state of a component will 
impact the other connected component. This 
influence will propagate to other components and 
whole system as well as the objectives of the 
system. The detail description about the influence 
propagation rule can be found in [6, 13, 16]. Figure 
8 shows the state change and the influence of the 
RCS cooldown using steam dump valve operation. 
The initial condition is indicated by the high 
temperature level in the RCS (sto10: high) and the 
steam dump valve is close (bar12: enable). The 
objective (obj7) of the counter action is to decrease 
the temperature level of the RCS (sto: low) by 
opening the steam dump valve (bar12: disable). 
 
5.2. Discussion 
The purposes of modeling the operator actions 
using MFM are to derive the objective of the 
control actions and to gather information of the 
impact of the counteractions. The objective of the 
control action can be easly derived from the 
objective or the conditional operation of the MFM 
control function. In case of RCS cooldown using 
steam dump through steam dump valve operation, 
the purpose of the control action is to cooldown the 
RCS by decreasing temperature level of the RCS.  
Furthermore, modeling the operator actions is 
essential for getting information of the impacts of 
the actions, especially components connected to 
controlled components. MFM, as a functional 
modeling based on causal effect relatios, is a useful 
tool for gathering information about the impact of 
the control actions. In case of RCS cooldown 
operation, the components influenced by the control 
actions derived from Fig. 7 are summarized in 
Table 3. Therefore, the components influenced by 
the control action are condenser and auxiliary 
feedwater system. 
 
Table 4. Components influenced by RCS cooldown 
operation 
Condtional 
operation 
Controlled 
component 
Influenced 
components 
Low volume of 
sto10 (low 
temperature of 
RCS) 
bar12 (open the 
steam dump 
valve) 
High volume of 
steam in sto7 
(condenser) 
High flow of 
water in tra14 
(auxiliary 
feedwater 
system) 
 
 
Benefits of having the information about the 
components influenced by the counteractions are to 
help operators increasing their situation awareness 
especially in emergency condition and reducing 
human errors while mitigating the accident and 
keeping the safe operation of the plant. The 
information can be added as a desirable feature of 
computer-based emergency operating procedures 
[17]. 
In term of situation awareness, there are three 
aspects of the benefits: 
- before counter action: operators will have 
clear views and understanding of the 
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purpose and the impacts of the 
counteraction 
- during counteraction: operators beside 
considering the controlled component, 
they will also look at to the influenced 
components 
- after counteraction: operators will monitor 
the state of impacted components, predict 
the future state and anticipate the future 
plant behavior related to the impacted 
components. 
Moreover, related to the reducing of human 
errors, in case of omission error, since they have 
enough information about the procedure step, they 
will follow the procedure step by step without 
intention to omit or skip one or more procedure 
steps. While in case of commission error, it will 
reduce the possibility of operators making mistake 
in controlling the components to mitigate the 
accidents. 
6. CONCLUSION 
 Multilevel flow modeling (MFM) is a useful 
tool to sucessfuly model the operator actions in 
mitigating accidents following the emergency 
operating procedures. It is because the MFM is 
based on causal-effect relation, has control 
functions and influence propagation features. The 
results of modeling the operator actions are 
necessary for determining the purpose and the 
impact of the counteractions.  
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